Consolidation has dramatically reduced the number of school districts in the United States. Using data from rural school districts in New York, this article provides the first direct estimation of consolidation's cost impacts. We find economies of size in operating spending: all else equal, doubling enrollment cuts operating costs per pupil by 61.7 percent for a 300-pupil district and by 49.6 percent for a 1,500-pupil district. Consolidation also involves large adjustment costs, however. These adjustment costs, which are particularly large for capital spending, lower net cost savings to 31.5 percent and 14.4 percent for a 300-pupil and a 1,500-pupil district, respectively. Overall, consolidation makes fiscal sense, particularly for very small districts, but states should avoid subsidizing unwarranted capital projects.
INTRODUCTION
School district consolidation represents one of the most dramatic changes in education governance and management in the United States in the last 100 years. Over 100,000 school districts have been eliminated through consolidation since 1938, a drop of almost 90 percent (National Center for Education Statistics 2006, table 84 ). This trend continues throughout the country, largely because consolidation is widely regarded as a way for school districts to cut costs. Using a unique panel data set for rural school districts in New York State, this article asks whether consolidation leads to significant cost savings, controlling for student performance. This analysis complements recent research on the causes of consolidation (Brasington 1999 (Brasington , 2003 Gordon and Knight 2006) .
Although the pace of school district consolidation has slowed since the 1970s, some states still provide incentives to consolidate. New York and several other states have aid programs designed to encourage district "reorganization," typically in the form of consolidation (NCES 2001) . Some other states encourage consolidation through their building or transportation aid formulas (Haller and Monk 1988) . In contrast, about one-third of states use operating aid formulas that compensate school districts for sparsity or small scale (Huang 2004 ) and thereby discourage consolidation. Although scholars do not agree on the cost impacts of consolidation, it is likely to remain on the education policy agenda in many states, particularly when school districts are under pressure to cut costs and raise student performance. As Haller and Monk (1988, p. 479 ) put it, "The modern reform movement is likely to prompt additional school district reorganization efforts, despite its virtual silence on the question of size."
This article begins with a discussion of the concept of economies of size and its link to school district consolidation. The third section provides a review of the cost function literature and evaluates existing evidence on economies of size in education. In the fourth section, we present the first formal evaluation of school district consolidation, including the first look at economies of size in capital spending. This evaluation is based on a panel of rural school districts in New York, some of which consolidated during the sample period, 1985-97.
ECONOMIES OF SIZE AND THE EFFECTS OF CONSOLIDATION
By altering the size of participating districts, consolidation could raise or lower per pupil costs. In this section we define economies of size and discuss the possible linkages between these economies and consolidation.
Defining Economies of Size
Economies of scale are said to arise when the cost per unit declines as the number of units goes up. In some contexts, the notion of a unit is straightforward; one could ask, for example, how the cost per widget changes with the number of widgets produced. In education, however, several different "units" could be defined, including the number of students, the quality of the services (as measured, say, by student performance), or the scope of educational services. 1 As in most empirical research on economies of scale in education, the focus here is on economies of size, which refer to the relationship between per pupil expenditure and total enrollment, all else equal. This relationship can be estimated from an education cost function, which controls for output (that is, student performance), input prices, and other variables. Economies (diseconomies) of size exist if the estimated elasticity of education costs per pupil with respect to enrollment is less than (greater than) zero. Tholkes (1991) and Pratten (1991) identify five potential sources of long-run economies of size that seem especially pertinent to education.
Potential Sources of Economics of Size

Indivisibilities:
Economies of size may exist because the services provided to each student by certain education professionals do not diminish in quality as the number of students increases, at least over some range. For example, all districts require a central administration, namely, a superintendent and school board, and the same central administration may be able to serve a significant range of enrollment. Moreover, teachers may provide a public good over some range of enrollment because they may be able to teach up to, say, fifteen students without a significant drop in the quality of education they provide. 
Increased dimension:
The traditional long-run concept of economies of scale focuses on savings associated with larger units of capital. Larger plants may be able to produce output at a lower average cost, because they can employ more specialized equipment, for example. In education, the logical plant is the school, and equipment includes the heating plant, communications system, and specialized facilities, such as science or computer labs. 3. Specialization: Economies of size might arise if larger schools are able to employ more specialized labor, such as science or math teachers. This possibility may provide a particularly compelling justification for consolidation in an era of rising standards, with its call for more demanding and specialized classes at the high school level (Haller and Monk 1988) .
1. See Duncombe and Yinger (1993) for a discussion of the relationship among these three definitions of scale. 2. Estimates of the effect of class size below fifteen students are hard to come by because classes of that size are not usually observed. For example, Krueger (1999) finds that a shift from twenty-two to fifteen students has significant performance benefits but does not observe the impact of even smaller class sizes. See also Ferguson and Ladd (1996) .
Price benefits of scale:
Large districts may be able to take advantage of the price benefits of scale by negotiating bulk purchases of supplies and equipment or by using their monopsony power to impose lower wages on their employees (Wasylenko 1977) .
Learning and innovation:
If the cost of implementing innovations in curriculum or management declines with experience, a larger district may be able to implement such innovations at lower cost. In addition, teachers may be more productive in a large school because they can draw on the experience of many colleagues.
Potential Sources of Diseconomies of Size
The existence of economies of size in education has been challenged by recent studies on the effects of large schools on student performance (Fowler and Walberg 1991; Lee and Smith 1997) . This research focuses on schools rather than districts and on production rather than cost functions. The distinction between school and district size is important in urban districts, but in rural areas the sizes of the district and the high school are highly correlated. These studies claim that the potential cost savings from consolidation are seldom realized and that larger schools have a learning environment that hurts student performance. The research on effective schools provides additional evidence that moderate-sized schools are more successful than large schools at retaining students through high school (Figlio and Stone 1999; Witte 1996) . Five potential sources of diseconomies of scale have been cited in this literature (Guthrie 1979; Howley 1996; Lee and Smith 1997) .
Higher transportation costs:
One potential source of higher costs for larger districts is transportation. To the extent that consolidating districts make use of larger schools, average transportation distance must increase, as must travel time for students (Kenny 1982) .
Labor relations effects:
According to Tholkes (1991, p. 510) , "The labor relations scale effect, caused by seniority hiring within certification areas and by change in comparison groups for collective negotiations, could be a major source of diseconomies of scale." The potential monopsony power of large districts may be counteracted by the increased likelihood of an active teachers' union because larger districts are easier to organize. Stronger unions may also prevent staff layoffs and thereby eliminate a major source of cost savings from consolidation. 3. Lower staff motivation and effort: Administrators and teachers may have a more positive attitude toward work in smaller schools, which tend to involve less formalization of rules and procedures, that is, more flexibility (Cotton 1996) . Smaller organizations are also "flatter" organizations with fewer layers of middle management between the teacher or principal and the superintendent, encouraging more input from all school personnel. 4. Lower student motivation and effort: Students in smaller schools may be more apt to participate in extracurricular school activities (Cotton 1996) . Moreover, the employees in smaller schools are more likely to know students by name and to identify and assist students at risk of dropping out. Thus students in smaller schools may have a greater sense of belonging to the school community, a more positive attitude toward school, and a higher motivation to learn (Cotton 1996; Barker and Gump 1964) . 5. Lower parental involvement: Parental contributions to educational production may be facilitated by parental participation in school activities and contacts with teachers and administrators. The role of parents is linked to economies of size whenever parents find participation less rewarding or personal contacts more difficult in larger districts.
RESEARCH ON ECONOMIES OF SIZE AND CONSOLIDATION
The vast majority of evidence on economies of size and, by inference, on consolidation has come from the estimation of education cost functions using data on operating or total spending. Literature reviews on this topic have highlighted some of the methodological differences among studies, including differences in outcome and resource-price measures, whether student performance is treated as an endogenous variable, and whether controls are included for unobserved factors, such as inefficiency (Andrews, Duncombe, and Yinger 2002; Fox 1981) . Despite the variety of measures used and geographic areas examined in these studies, a surprising consensus emerges: "Sizeable potential cost savings may exist by moving from a very small district . . . to a district with 2000-4000 pupils, both in instructional and administrative costs" (Andrews, Duncombe, and Yinger 2002, p. 255) . While cross-sectional spending regressions can provide evidence of potential cost savings from consolidation, a more direct and compelling approach is to apply longitudinal methods to a sample of school districts in which some consolidation occurred. No formal evaluations of this type have been conducted, however. Existing case studies (Weast 1997; Benton 1992 ) focus on only one school district, have no control group or do not use statistical controls, and have limited pre-and post-consolidation data. A case study by Streifel, Foldesy, and Holman (1991) compares pre-and post-consolidation finance data in a national sample of nineteen school districts but does not include controls for student achievement, teacher salaries, or changing student composition. Thus, as emphasized by Howley (1996, p. 25) : "The lack of pre-and post-consolidation studies means that we have no solid information about the accrual of benefits alleged to depend on school closures and consolidation."
EVALUATION OF SCHOOL DISTRICT CONSOLIDATION IN NEW YORK
New York State provides an excellent setting for an evaluation of consolidation. First, New York actively promotes the consolidation of small districts by providing "reorganization aid." Specifically, New York contributes up to an additional 40 percent in formula operating aid ("Incentive Operating Aid") to consolidated districts for five years. This aid is then phased out slowly over another nine years. "Incentive Building Aid" provides up to an additional 30 percent in building aid for capital projects that are committed within ten years of reorganization (New York State Education Department 2006 
Evaluation Design
To estimate the impact of consolidation on education costs, we begin with the standard formulation of an education cost function (Downes and Pogue 1994; Yinger 2000, 2001; Reschovsky and Imazeki 2001; Imazeki and Reschovsky 2004) :
where E is school spending per pupil; S is school performance; P is input prices; N is enrollment; M is environmental cost factors, which are fixed inputs outside the control of school officials; and Z is a set of factors that influence school district inefficiency. 5 This cost function can be applied to total spending, to operating or capital spending, or to functional subcategories of spending, 3. The Incentive Operating Aid subsidy of 40 percent is for consolidations after July 1993. From 1983 until 1993, the incentive aid was 20 percent of basic operating aid. Capital projects may be reimbursed under Incentive Building Aid past ten years as long as the project is approved within ten years of consolidation. Some consolidating districts still receive building subsidies twenty years after consolidation. A number of districts that were receiving reorganization building aid in 1981 were still receiving this aid in 1997. Most of these districts consolidated before 1979. 4. During this period, three elementary school districts, each with fewer than one hundred students, merged with much larger K-12 districts. We do not consider these districts in our analysis. Eight consolidations have occurred in New York since the latest one in our data. Although a few of these consolidations took place in our sample period, we do not include them (and we drop the districts involved) because we want to observe at least two years of data after consolidation. 5. Total enrollment is our measure of district size; in our sample of districts, this variable is highly correlated with an alternative measure, average daily membership. such as administration, instruction, or transportation. This approach can account for more than one measure of school performance, and it can shed light on the costs associated with all of a district's activities, including counseling, health, transportation, and administration. In our data set, which is described below, S is measured using student test scores and the dropout rate, P is measured with teacher salaries, and M is measured by the characteristics of the students in a school district, such as the share who live in poverty. Because we observe spending, not cost, our analysis also must consider school district inefficiency, defined as spending any more than necessary, given input and environmental costs, to provide a given level of performance. Thus inefficiency is tied to the performance variables included in the regression. A school district is inefficient if it provides activities that do not boost performance as measured by the variables in S, even if those activities are worthwhile in some other sense, or if it pays overly generous wages, hires too many administrators, or uses outmoded teaching methods. Inefficiency cannot be observed directly; we control for it by including a set of school district characteristics, Z, that influence the extent to which the behavior of teachers and school administrators is monitored by parents and voters Yinger 2001, 2007). 6 To estimate this model, we assemble pre-and post-consolidation data for all consolidating districts and for a comparison group in the years 1985-97. Because all the consolidating districts are rural, the comparison group consists of other rural districts.
7 All of these districts, consolidating and comparison, are "upstate," that is, not in the New York City region. Following most previous studies, we specify equation 1 in log-linear form. 8 We face four major methodological challenges. This section describes our basic approach; robustness checks are presented with the results. First, we need to specify the cost impact of consolidation. A key component of this impact is picked up, of course, by the population variable, N.
9 Consolidated districts are, by definition, larger than the separate districts that consolidate, and the cost impact of the resulting increase in enrollment can be determined from the coefficients of the enrollment variables. We use a quadratic specification 6. Unobserved determinants of school district efficiency are an unlikely source of bias in our regressions because they are largely captured by district fixed effects and time trends, which are discussed below. For a review of approaches to efficiency in a cost model, see Duncombe and Yinger (2007) . 7. Two consolidating districts, Draper and Mohonasen, were classified as "upstate suburban districts" by the New York State Department of Education. However, these districts lie on the edge of a small urban area, Schenectady, and are quite rural in character. 8. Some studies, such as Gyimah-Brempong and Gyapong (1991) , use a general trans-log specification, but this approach is not practical with the sample size available for this study. 9. For any given district size, the size of schools may affect student performance and costs. It is not appropriate to include school size in a cost model, however, because it reflects endogenous administrative decisions that influence efficiency, not exogenous factors that influence costs.
for ln(N); that is, we include ln(N) and [ln(N)] 2 . This specification makes it possible to determine if cost per pupil reaches a maximum or minimum at some enrollment level. In addition, consolidation might result in adjustment costs that fade over time or some other type of spending shock. To account for this possibility, we include a post-consolidation dummy variable and time trend for each consolidating district pair.
10 This approach not only yields an estimate of the average adjustment costs, it also allows for the possibility that some districts are more efficient than others in making the adjustments associated with consolidation. Second, unobserved factors influencing the consolidation decision (and hence N) might also influence spending per pupil, so our estimated coefficients could be subject to endogeneity bias if these unobserved factors are not taken into account. To address this problem, we estimate our model with district-specific fixed effects and time trends. This well-known approach accounts for all unobservable factors that vary linearly over time and therefore eliminates the possibility of bias from these factors, even if they are correlated with consolidation.
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To preserve all pre-consolidation information, we retain each district as a separate observation even after it consolidates. Once a district has consolidated, however, we assign it the characteristics of the combined district as a whole. This approach requires an adjustment in the district fixed effects variables to account for consolidation. Because the post-consolidation dependent variable combines spending per pupil for the two districts, the fixed effect for each original district (a) is diluted and (b) has an impact on the dependent variable for post-consolidation observations of its partner district. After consolidation, therefore, each district's fixed effect is weighted by that district's share of total enrollment in the combined district just before the consolidation and is switched on for each consolidating district and its partner.
12 These two steps are also applied to the district-specific time trend. District fixed effects and time trends provide extensive protection against endogeneity bias but cannot protect against factors that influence both spending and the decision to consolidate and that vary in a nonlinear way over time. In the case of New York State, such factors are unlikely to play a major role. According to the rules in New York, consolidation is a process, not an event 10 . We specify these variables so that one coefficient provides the state average post-consolidation shift and one provides the state average post-consolidation trend. See the technical appendix. 11. The role of fixed effects is discussed in Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) ; Bloom (1984) provides an example involving both fixed effects and time trends. 12. Formal definitions of district fixed effects and trends are in the technical appendix. Our method requires the (possibly incorrect) assumption that the weight assigned to each partner in a consolidating pair does not vary over time; once consolidation has occurred, we observe only characteristics of the consolidated district.
(University of the State of New York, n.d.). Districts considering consolidation must first ask the New York State Department of Education for an analysis of this step, along with a recommendation. Once this analysis and recommendation have been prepared, the districts must negotiate with the state about the aid involved and decide whether to proceed. If they do, they must present the consolidation option to the voters and cannot consolidate without the approval of a majority of the voters in each participating district. As a result, consolidation generally cannot be completed for two or three years from the time the state is brought into the discussion. In this setting, short-term fluctuations in the relative social or economic position of a district are unlikely to have an impact on the consolidation decision, and controlling for district fixed effects and time trends provides adequate insurance against selection bias. One possible exception involves a change in district leadership. A new superintendent might push for consolidation even when his or her predecessor did not think it was a good idea. Thus we control for a change in superintendent within the last two years.
The third methodological challenge is that S, P, and possibly state aid (one of the variables in Z) are influenced by the actions of school officials and are therefore endogenous. The endogeneity of S and P is explored in previous cost studies. The state aid variable used in our capital cost model is endogenous for three main reasons. First, it includes at least one important aid program, building aid, which uses a matching formula.
13 Second, building aid in New York is project based, which means that a district must submit a capital project to the state for approval and funding. Third, as indicated above, New York increases both operating and building aid for districts that consolidate, so aid may also be endogenous if the above steps do not adequately address the endogeneity of the consolidation decision. We avoid this problem in our operating aid regressions by using an operating aid variable that does not include the extra operating aid associated with consolidation. The impact of this extra aid is picked up by our post-consolidation fixed effects and time trends.
We address the endogeneity of S, P, and (in the capital regression) aid using two-stage least squares. Following well-known rules, we select instruments for this procedure that (1) make conceptual sense, (2) help to explain the endogenous explanatory variables, and (3) do not have a significant direct impact on the dependent variable. To meet the first two rules, we considered determinants of the demand for education as instruments for S, determinants 13. New York uses a closed-ended matching formula, and we do not know if a given district has used up its eligibility for matching funds. Thus we prefer the model with total funding, but models with the matching rate as an explanatory variable yield similar results.
of local labor market conditions as instruments for P, and factors influencing state aid as instruments for the aid variable. In addition, we conducted an overidentification test (Wooldridge 2003) to determine whether our final set of instruments was exogenous, and we implemented the Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) procedure to check for weak instruments.
14 The best-known education demand variables are district income, state aid, and tax price. However, income, tax base (the denominator of tax price), and state aid are also determinants of school district efficiency Yinger 2000, 2001) . In particular, they influence voters' incentives to monitor school officials and voters' preferences for a broad range of educational outcomes, not just basic test scores as identified by S. As a result, these variables violate the third rule listed above and are not legitimate instruments.
To identify alternative instruments, we draw on the "copycat" theory of Case, Hines, and Rosen (1993) , which suggests that voters' desired level of student performance depends in part on what similar districts are able to accomplish. Unlike Case, Hines, and Rosen, however, we are not estimating a structural model of this behavior, so we cannot literally use (potentially endogenous) performance measures for similar districts. Instead, we select instruments from the set of exogenous variables that influence performance in adjacent districts. The amount a district must pay to attract and retain teachers of a given quality depends on conditions in the local private labor market (Ondrich, Pas, and Yinger 2007) . Variables measuring private wages and employment conditions are therefore used as instruments for teacher wages.
For the operating cost models, the final set of instruments includes the log of average values of per pupil income and per pupil operating aid in adjacent districts and the log of average private sector wages, the log of average manufacturing wages, the unemployment rate, and the ratio of employment to students in the district's county. The capital spending model uses the same instruments plus average per pupil property value in adjacent districts, lagged three years.
The final methodological challenge is that capital spending is lumpy, so capital spending in a given year is not a good indication of a district's long-term 14. The Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) procedure is not specified for a model with as many endogenous variables as ours. Neither is the alternative procedure by Stock and Yogo (2005) . Thus we examined various combinations of the instruments and used the set that produced the highest partial F test for most endogenous variables. The F statistics for our final runs indicate that we have strong instruments in most cases. For most endogenous variables, the F statistics are all above 15. The one exception is the PEP test variable, for which the F statistics are between 6.4 and 7.9. Operating, instructional, teaching, and capital spending all pass the overidentification test at the 5 percent confidence level. Administration and transportation spending do not pass this test using the instruments we selected for operating spending. When one of the instruments from this list is dropped, however, these models pass the overidentification test and yield results that are virtually the same as those presented in the text.
expected annual capital spending. Indeed, capital spending often exhibits a large "spike" somewhere between two and eight years after the consolidation took place. Consolidation is not the whole story, however, because capital spending takes the form of a spike in nonconsolidating districts, too. To focus on expected long-term spending, we define the dependent variable in our capital cost regression as a district's four-year average capital spending. We can calculate this variable for every year in our panel, because our data on spending, unlike our data for most explanatory variables, goes back until 1977. The dependent variable for a 1985 observation (the first year in our panel) therefore is based on the four-year average from 1982 through 1985. To reflect the fact that capital deteriorates over time, we used a 2 percent annual depreciation rate to adjust capital spending. The use of four-year average capital spending necessitates three other changes in our cost model for capital spending. First, we also average the enrollment variable over the same four-year period. This step makes it possible to interpret the coefficient of the enrollment variables as describing the impact of a long-run shift in enrollment on a district's expected long-run annual capital spending. Second, state aid for capital spending in New York State is largely project-based aid, so the time series for state aid is almost as lumpy as the series for capital spending. To smooth out the state-aid data, that is, to translate it into a long-run measure, we also use a district's four-year average state aid as an (endogenous) explanatory variable.
15 Third, the use of a fouryear average for capital spending requires a change in the district-specific fixed effects and time trends (including those for the period after consolidation). Our approach requires data on student performance. Previous research on New York has identified two performance measures that are correlated with voter preferences and linked to state accountability programs: the percent of students achieving minimum competency on elementary school math and reading tests (PEP tests) and the percent of students receiving a Regents diploma, which requires passing a set of demanding exams in high school (Duncombe, Ruggiero, and Yinger 1996; Yinger 2000, 2001) .
19 Accounting for the second variable is particularly important in New York, where one argument for consolidation is that it facilitates the offering of special classes to support the Regents exams.
For our price variable, we use information on the average salary for teachers with one through five years of experience, which is a better indicator of the cost of attracting teachers than a measure of salaries for more experienced teachers. To control for teacher quality differences, we regressed actual salaries on teacher education and experience, and then constructed a predicted wage for teachers with average experience and education.
Environmental variables identified in past research include the share of students in a district in poverty, from a single-parent family, with limited English proficiency, with special needs, or in high school. Our environmental variables are the percentage of students receiving a subsidized lunch, a wellknown proxy for poverty, and the percentage of students in secondary grades. District fixed effects and trend variables control for unobserved student and family characteristics, at least to the extent that they follow a linear time trend.
To capture efficiency in the cost model, we include income per pupil, tax base per pupil, and state operating aid per pupil divided by total income, which we call the state aid ratio.
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Empirical Results
Descriptive Analysis
The first two columns of tables 2 and 3 compare the characteristics of consolidating districts in 1985, before they consolidated, with the characteristics of nonconsolidating rural districts in the same year. 21 On the financial side 19. Another important performance measure is the graduation rate. An imperfect measure of this rate is available for New York; including it in our analysis has little impact on the results. 20. Standard theory calls for median income instead of income per pupil, but these two variables are highly correlated. Standard theory also indicates that the income term should be median income plus the product of state aid per pupil and tax price. Our specification for the aid variable is designed to approximate this additive income term. See Yinger (2000, 2001) . 21. We filled in data in a few districts when we had a plausible method for doing so. Thus, for example, we occasionally filled in poverty with the average values for the previous and succeeding years and filled in teacher salaries with the average for similar districts in the same county. We did not fill in missing data on test scores.
( Turning to table 3, we find that in 1985 consolidating districts had fewer pupils per administrator, lower property wealth, smaller total enrollment, smaller schools, fewer schools, and a lower percentage of students going to college. For example, 50 percent of consolidating districts had only one school before consolidation, but no one-school districts remained after consolidation. Table 3 also suggests that consolidation has at best modest effects on student performance. Differences between consolidating and nonconsolidating districts were not significant in 1985, except for a lower college-going rate in consolidating districts. The pattern in 1997 is similar, with only one significant difference-namely, a smaller failure rate on the math PEP tests for consolidating districts. These differences are consistent with the view that consolidation boosts performance, but the differences are small in magnitude. Table 3 also does not support the view that consolidation increases the number of more demanding Regents courses and hence the number of students receiving Regents diplomas. Table 4 shows that, almost across the board, inflation-adjusted expenditure per pupil, revenue per pupil, and average teacher salaries are higher after consolidation than before. The only exception is state operating aid. However, a similar pattern emerges in nonconsolidating districts.
22 Table 4 also shows that capital and maintenance expenditures rise more rapidly after consolidation than before, but operating spending, along with associated spending on teaching and central administration, grows more slowly.
Cost Regression Results
The cost models were estimated using two-stage least squares (2SLS). Student outcomes and teacher salaries were treated as endogenous in all models; the state aid ratio was also treated as endogenous in the capital spending model. Separate regressions were estimated for operating expenditure, capital expenditure, and selected functional subcategories of expenditure that do not involve 22. One possible explanation is that New York experienced a rapid increase in special education spending during this period (Lankford and Wyckoff 1996) . a Adjusted using the fixed weighted GNP price deflator for state and local government purchases published by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (with 2002 dollars as the base).
b For districts with only one school, the school was counted as both a high school and an elementary school in calculating school size. * statistically significant at 5%; * * statistically significant at 10%. Notes: Estimated using linear 2SLS regression with district fixed effects and trend variables. Student outcomes, state aid, and teacher salaries are treated as endogenous. The dependent variable for the operating cost model is the log of real per pupil spending. The dependent variable for the capital cost model is the four-year average of the log of real per pupil capital spending adjusted for depreciation using a 2% annual rate.
a State aid for the operating cost model is real per pupil operating aid (without supplements for consolidation) divided by average income. For the capital cost model, the four-year average of total real state aid per pupil is divided by average income in that year.
substantial capital spending. Table 5 presents detailed results for operating and capital spending per pupil. Regressions for functional spending subcategories include the same explanatory variables (and instruments) as the operating spending model. Because the regressions include district-specific fixed effects and time trends, the estimated coefficients are identified only by nonlinear variation in the explanatory variables. Thanks to the large nonlinear changes in enrollment caused by consolidation, this methodology is ideal for estimating the enrollment coefficients and other consolidation cost effects, but it also implies that the coefficients of other variables do not provide compelling tests of the impact of these variables on education costs. In other words, the district-specific fixed effects and time trends undermine our ability to estimate precisely the impact of the non-enrollment variables in order to minimize the possibility of bias in the coefficients of the consolidation-related variables.
In the operating cost regression, the first column of table 5, the teacher salary variable has the expected sign and magnitude, 0.73, and is statistically significant. The estimated coefficients of the outcome variables and the other cost variables are small and statistically insignificant, however. Because these variables are significant with the expected signs in other analyses using New York data in this period Yinger 2000, 2001) , we interpret these results as an indication that it is difficult to identify the effects of these variables in a model that contains fixed effects and time trends. We also find that efficiency increases with district income, the opposite of findings in previous studies. The other efficiency variables are insignificant. A change in superintendent increases spending, but this effect is not significant at conventional levels. In the case of capital costs, the district fixed effects and time trends remove so much variation that we cannot identify the impacts of any outcome, cost, or efficiency variables. See the last two columns of table 5.
Estimated Economies of Size
The coefficients of the enrollment variables in the first column of table 5 are significant statistically and indicate large economies of size in operating spending. 23 The positive coefficient on the second enrollment variable indicates that these economies diminish with size, but this effect is small and strong economies of size persist throughout the enrollment range in our sample. We find no economies of size in capital spending, however; indeed, the coefficient and its t-statistic are close to zero, so we have dropped the enrollment variables from the capital regression in column 2.
24 Table 6 presents the coefficients of the enrollment variables for various categories of spending. We dropped the second enrollment variable, the square of log enrollment, if it were not statistically significant at the 10 percent level, which was true in every case except overall operating spending. We find that economies of size arise not only for operating spending but also for 23. Other studies of New York school districts find smaller economies of size, probably because they combine urban and rural districts. Estimates in Duncombe and Yinger (2001) , for example, imply operating cost savings of 13 percent for a change in enrollment from three hundred to six hundred. 24. Dropping the enrollment variable also has little impact on other coefficients in the regression. instructional spending (and its teaching subcategory) and administration. We do not find significant economies of size for transportation.
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The estimated economies of size are illustrated in the last three columns of table 6. These columns indicate the economies of size associated with three hypothetical consolidations, corresponding roughly to the types of consolidations in our data (see table 1). Our estimates imply that operating cost per pupil declines by 61.7 percent when two 300-pupil districts merge, but the cost savings drop to 49.6 percent when two 1,500-pupil districts merge.
Results for the functional spending categories indicate savings of 44 to 54 percent in instruction, teaching, and administration for any consolidation that doubles student enrollment. These results support the view that there is publicness in the provision of classroom instruction and in administration. The (insignificant) result for transportation indicates much smaller savings-27.7 percent-for this enrollment change.
Estimated Non-enrollment Cost Impacts of Consolidation
The district-specific fixed effects and time trends for each consolidating pair measure the cost impacts of consolidation that are not associated with enrollment. The mean values of these coefficients (and associated t-statistics) are presented in the first two columns of table 7. Both operating spending and the spending subcategories exhibit the same significant pattern: a large upward shift in per pupil costs at the time of consolidation, followed by a gradual decline in per pupil costs in the following years. In the case of administration and transportation, these upward shifts declined to zero by ten years, which is the maximum period we observe after a consolidation. In the case of operating, instruction, and teaching, however, the net shift is still positive after ten years.
The last two columns of table 7 indicate the average annual impact of these post-consolidation cost shifts.
26 These effects are calculated with both a tenyear and a thirty-year horizon. Because the ten-year horizon corresponds to the longest post-consolidation period that we can observe, we have no evidence about adjustment costs after ten years, and the thirty-year calculations assume that adjustment costs drop to zero starting in the eleventh year. Roughly speaking, therefore, the ten-year and thirty-year calculations provide upper and 25. We also estimated a three-stage least squares (3SLS) model for instruction, administration, and transportation, to account for the possibility that errors are correlated across equations; the enrollment coefficients are very close to those in table 6. 26. To derive the formula for these impacts, start with the present value (PV) of real spending E discounted at rate r . The percentage change in PV (or the associated annuity) with adjustment costs equal to n y percent in year y is a The non-enrollment effects are calculated by first adding the average intercept coefficient and the product of the average time trend coefficient and the number of years after consolidation. Because the dependent variable is in logarithms, this sum is exponentiated to obtain the percent change in costs in a given year. These changes are calculated for each year, and the present value is calculated for the selected time horizon and discount rate using the formula in note 26. The discount rate is set at 5%.
b The non-enrollment cost impacts of consolidation are assumed to end after ten years, which is the maximum number of years after consolidation observed in our data. This approach understates these effects if they linger beyond this time.
c The estimate of the total effect is a weighted average of the effects for capital and operating separately, with the weights based on the expenditure share for capital (9.2%) and operating (90.8%) for nonconsolidating districts in 1997.
lower bounds, respectively, for the average annual adjustment costs of consolidation over the long run. To put it another way, assuming that the adjustment costs phase out after ten years, instead of simply disappearing, would result in average annual adjustment costs between these two estimates.
27
Our estimates indicate large adjustment costs associated with consolidation. With a ten-year horizon, adjustment costs equal 56 percent for both 27 . Simple extrapolation of our results implies that capital adjustment costs continue to grow after ten years. Although this type of growth is implausible, extrapolating our operating and capital results for the thirty-year cost calculations would lower the savings to 27 percent for the first hypothetical consolidation in table 8 and to 12 percent for the third.
operating and capital spending. They also exceed 55 percent for instructional spending and teaching but are much smaller for administration (30.1 percent) and transportation (22.3 percent). With a thirty-year horizon, these annual adjustment costs are cut in half.
The capital-cost regression in table 5 holds current student performance constant, but it does not control for future student performance. Consequently, the short-run non-enrollment cost increases we estimate could result in longrun performance increases. One possibility is that consolidation and the aid that accompanies it encourage districts to speed up the capital projects that they would have taken anyway. Indeed, districts have a strong incentive to speed up their capital projects: in order to receive consolidation-based building aid, districts must have capital projects approved within ten years after consolidation. To the extent that the non-enrollment capital cost increases that we estimate reflect this type of speeding up, they will be partially offset by capital cost decreases in the future. From society's point of view, the present value of future cost savings will not fully offset short-run cost increases, but they will offset them to some degree.
A related possibility is that districts take advantage of the opportunities for capital planning and state aid increases that accompany consolidation to undertake capital projects that boost student performance in the long run. Our regressions are not designed to study this type of effect. These regressions estimate the relationship between capital spending over a four-year period and student performance at the end of that period, but, as explained earlier, they include district-specific fixed effects and time trends, so the performance coefficients are based only on nonlinear variation in the performance variables. Table 8 combines the enrollment effects in table 6 and the non-enrollment  effects in table 7 . Capital costs are weighted at their share of spending in nonconsolidating districts in 1997-9.2 percent. With this weighting, economies of size in operating spending result in overall annual cost savings of 56.0 percent, 48.6 percent, and 45.1 percent for the three hypothetical consolidations in table 8 (row 1). Combining the enrollment and non-enrollment cost effects requires a multiplicative, not an additive, formula. More specifically, if economies of size cut costs by x percent and adjustment costs raise costs by y percent, then the net percentage change in costs equals [(1 − x) 
Net Cost Impacts of Consolidation
28. Adding economies of size that lower spending by e percent per year to the formula in note 26 leads to the percent change in PV (or the associated annuity) due to consolidation: With a ten-year horizon, the net cost savings for the three hypothetical consolidations are 31.5, 19.8, and 14.4, respectively (row 2) . The annual cost savings are roughly 14 percentage points higher for our calculations with a thirty-year horizon (row 3). The remaining rows show the net cost impacts of consolidation for operating and capital costs separately.
Robustness Checks
We also estimate several alternative models to address possible weaknesses in our basic approach. These models address concerns about the identification of economies of size, the matching of consolidating and nonconsolidating districts, and the possible endogeneity of the consolidation variables despite the steps described earlier.
The enrollment changes and other adjustments that accompany consolidation arise at the same time, so it may be difficult to separate their impacts on education costs. Moreover, our district fixed effects and time trends imply that we estimate the enrollment coefficients based solely on nonlinear changes in enrollment. The most obvious such change is the one associated with consolidation. If enrollment in nonconsolidating districts does not have much nonlinear variation over time and the consolidation decision is endogenous, then our procedure might lead to misleading estimates of economies of size. To address these possibilities, we interact the enrollment variable (or variables if a squared term is included) in each regression with the consolidation variable to determine whether estimated economies of size are different in consolidating and nonconsolidating districts. 29 This interaction term is never close to statistically significant. This result indicates that we can estimate economies of size based on nonlinear enrollment change in nonconsolidating districts, and it suggests that neither collinearity nor endogeneity leads to a different estimate of economies of size in districts that consolidate. As demonstrated by the large literature on matching, a comparison of treated observations with observations that are unlikely ever to be treated can lead to inaccurate estimates of the treatment effect, at least when this effect varies across observations (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith 1999) . Our second robustness check is designed to address the possibility by first estimating a logit model of the consolidation decision. As shown in Efron (1988) , this model expresses the probability of consolidation in year t, given that it has not happened before t, as a function of the exogenous variables in our cost equation. This model yields a propensity score for each district in each year, defined as the predicted probability that the district will be consolidated in that year. 30 Then, following the advice of Cobb-Clark and Crossley (2003, p. 508), we "inspect the distribution of propensity scores and impose the common support condition (by trimming the data)." 31 More specifically, we first find the lowest propensity score for any consolidating district in the year it consolidates. Then we drop every nonconsolidating district with a propensity score below this value in every year. The results are presented in the second column of table 9. We find that trimming the sample has little impact on estimated economies of size for spending on operating expenses, instruction, teaching, and administration, although it does eliminate the significance of the squared term in the operating 29. We also estimated models with a dummy variable for the year before consolidation. It was never significant, which suggests that we are not missing a pre-consolidation shock. 30. Our logit model yields the P it , which is the probability that district i will consolidate in year t given that it did not consolidate before t. The propensity to be consolidated in year t, Q it , equals
31. This is, of course, the simplest possible matching procedure. We cannot implement other matching methods, such as propensity-score matching, because some of our observations combine and remain in the sample. We did implement another simple test for heterogeneous impact of consolidation, namely, to interact the consolidation dummy with district characteristics, such as income and property value. No interaction term was significant at the 5 percent level. a These estimates exclude the seventeen nonconsolidating districts with a propensity score that falls below the minimum observed for consolidating districts in the year of consolidation. The propensity scores are obtained from a logit model that includes all exogenous variables from the cost model (except fixed effects and time trends) as explanatory variables.
b This model includes as an explanatory variable the propensity score derived from a logit model of the consolidation decision. It explains the decision to consolidate in a given year as a function of the years since the last consolidation in the county, the district's three-year change in enrollment, the aid ratio in districts with similar enrollment, and the instruments used in the operating spending model.
regression. In the case of transportation spending, the enrollment coefficient with the trimmed sample is almost 60 percent above the baseline result in the first column and is now statistically significant. These results suggest that noncomparability of the consolidating and nonconsolidating samples is not a problem in most cases but might lead to an understatement of economies of size in transportation. Finally, despite the institutional constraints on consolidation and the steps we have taken to address endogeneity, we cannot formally rule out the possibility that our estimates are biased by unobservable factors that influence both consolidation (and hence enrollment) and nonlinear variation in spending. We address this problem using a control function. 32 As explained by 32. We cannot use standard IV methods; consolidation cannot be replaced by a predicted value because it is built into the structure of our fixed effects and time trends. Moreover, we cannot use the Ziliak Todd (2006, p. 31) , "Control function estimators explicitly recognize that nonrandom selection in the program [i.e., consolidation] gives rise to an endogeneity problem in the model and try to obtain unbiased parameter estimates by modeling the source of the endogeneity." In our case, we estimate another logit model of a district's decision to consolidate in a given year. Then, following the approach described in Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004), we include the propensity to be consolidated, as defined earlier, from this model as an explanatory variable in our cost equation.
33 As Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (p. 36) point out, "The control function approach is more general than the matching approach," because it addresses both comparability and endogeneity, and is therefore more general, but considerably more complicated, than our simple trimming method. The control function approach requires a model of the participation decision and identifying restrictions. Drawing on the literature on the decision to consolidate (Brasington 1999 (Brasington , 2003 Gordon and Knight 2006) , we model consolidation as a function of the history of consolidation in nearby districts, recent social changes in the district, and the environment in which the district operates. More specifically, our logit model estimates the probability of consolidation in a given year as a function of the number of years since the previous consolidation in the same county, the preceding three-year change in the district's enrollment, the total state aid ratio in districts with similar enrollment, and the instruments identified for our cost regression. 34 Because the first three variables are not in the cost regression, they provide the identifying restrictions needed for the control function approach to work. As shown in the last column of table 9, the control-function approach leads to virtually the same enrollment coefficients as the baseline model for overall operating spending and for spending on instruction, teaching, and administration. Adding a control function does alter the results for transportation, however. Compared with the baseline model, the control-function model indicates much larger economies of size, which are significant at the 1 percent level. Although these results are not presented in table 9, we also find that switching to the control-function approach has little impact on estimates of the non-enrollment cost impact of consolidation. The largest impact by far is and Kniesner (1998) IV method for panel data, because it applies to observations that drop out of the sample at a point in time (due, in their case, to unemployment). 33. This propensity score is not significant at the 5 percent level in any of our regressions. Heckman and Navarro-Lozano show (p. 34) that the control function can be approximated by a polynomial in the propensity score. The square of the propensity score is also never significant, and adding it has little impact on our results. 34. This model is supported by the data. The years since a consolidation in the county have a significant negative impact on consolidation, for example, and the pseudo R-squared of the model is 0.52. The results for the control-function version of the cost model are not highly sensitive to the variables included in this logit model. on transportation, for which the average intercept goes up from 0.389 to 0.445 and the average trend coefficient goes from −0.038 to −0.041. Overall, our robustness checks provide further evidence for both large economies of scale and large adjustment costs associated with consolidation. Moreover, for all operating spending categories except transportation, our baseline model appears to use reasonably comparable treatment and control groups and to adequately control for the endogeneity of the consolidation decision. These robustness checks in table 9 also indicate, however, that the baseline model understates both the magnitude and significance of economies of size in transportation. In fact, the control function approach indicates that, with a ten-year horizon, doubling enrollment will result in a 36.5 percent decline in transportation costs per pupil due to economies of size and a net decline of 22.3 percent after non-enrollment adjustment costs are taken into account.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Because of significant economies of size, consolidation clearly cuts operating costs for small, rural school districts in New York. Although consolidation also results in large adjustment costs in operating spending, these adjustment costs phase out and are not large enough to eliminate the savings due to economies of size. The operating cost savings are largest when consolidation combines two very small districts, but even two 1,500-pupil districts can cut their operating costs by at least 20 percent through consolidation.
We do not find economies of size in capital spending. Moreover, we find that consolidation results in large adjustment costs in capital spending, costs that grow throughout our sample period. These adjustment costs are clearly worthy of further investigation. To what extent do they decline after the tenyear post-consolidation period in our data? To what extent are they encouraged by the large aid increases that accompany consolidation? To what extent do they boost student performance (and therefore lower costs) in the future?
These results do not provide a complete benefit-cost analysis of consolidation because they do not consider losses in consumer surplus associated with fewer districts to choose from (Bradford and Oates 1974) , changes in transportation costs for students and their parents, or changes in the costs of providing educational outcomes other than those measured by the test scores in our analysis. 35 Because consolidation in New York requires the consent of voters in each consolidating district, we presume that benefits to voters are 35. Consumer surplus losses may be offset by declines in tax price. An analysis of this issue based on demand functions estimated by Duncombe and Yinger (2001) finds this to be true in the average consolidating district in New York. This analysis is available from the authors on request.
perceived to outweigh costs in every district that consolidates with another.
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In other words, costs we do not measure, if they exist, must not be large enough to overcome cost savings, at least in the perceptions of voters. Some evidence on this point comes from another recent study of rural school districts in New York (Hu and Yinger 2006) , which estimates whether people are willing to pay more for housing in a district after it consolidates with another district. The study finds that the impact of consolidation on house values is quite large, about 25 percent, in very small districts but declines with enrollment to about 6 percent in a district with an enrollment of 1,500. These results suggest that home buyers perceive the economies of size associated with consolidation. 37 They also indicate that up to at least 1,500 pupils, the perceived advantages of consolidation outweigh the perceived disadvantages, which could include larger private transportation costs or a loss of consumer surplus. Further exploration of these other issues clearly is warranted.
The key policy question, of course, is whether states should encourage school district consolidation. After all, state education departments have played a central role in encouraging and sometimes financially supporting school district consolidation (Haller and Monk 1988) . New York backs up its commitment to consolidation with a sizable long-term subsidy to consolidating governments, on the order of $30 million per year.
Our results indicate that financial support for consolidation is warranted, particularly for small districts, because a state can lower the overall cost of education by taking advantage of economies of size. Although rural school districts face substantial adjustment costs when they consolidate, economies of size more than offset these costs. Our estimates indicate overall cost savings between 14 and 44 percent, depending on the sizes of the consolidating districts and the time horizon. Rural school districts in New York appear to be reasonably representative of rural districts nationwide, but formal studies of consolidation in other states would be valuable.
We also find that capital costs shift upward substantially after consolidation, in part, perhaps, because of increased state aid. The key lesson for state policy makers, we believe, is that they should carefully monitor post-consolidation capital spending. They need to make certain that consolidation and the state aid given to support it do not result in capital projects that are not cost effective. This is a difficult task, to say the least, because the relationship between capital 36. This logic is also central to analyses of the fiscal incentives that lead to consolidation (Brasington 1999 (Brasington , 2003 Gordon and Knight 2006) and to Fisher and Wassmer's (1998) analysis of the number of school districts in a metropolitan area. 37. In estimating the determinants of consolidation, Gordon and Knight (2006) find evidence that voters in Iowa also perceive economies of size, but only up to an enrollment of 250 students.
spending and long-run student performance is poorly understood, but state officials should monitor capital projects based on the best available knowledge about this relationship.
